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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) . This case was poured over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals by action dated March 21, 1996. (R229) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issues; 
I. Whether the District Court erred in determining that 
a vested right is the same thing under law as a non-
conforming use, in view of the Utah statutes and Salt 
Lake County ordinances that define the concept of 
"non-conforming use." 
II. Whether the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment has 
jurisdiction over (i) development applications 
involving vested rights or (ii) appeals from action by 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission on such 
applications. 
III. Whether Stonebridge exhausted its administrative 
remedies by filing its development application with 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, presenting 
the application at a hearing before the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission, and presenting the matter 
to the Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners. 
IV. Whether Stonebridge was required to request a variance 
from the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment in order 
to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
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V. Whether Stonebridge is entitled to declaratory 
judgment resolving the vested rights issue presented, 
or, at the very least, determining who can resolve the 
vested rights issue, under circumstances where the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission refused to 
consider the merits of Stonebridge's conditional use 
application until the vested rights issue is first 
decided. 
VI. Whether it was error for the lower court to grant 
summary judgment on a motion to dismiss that both 
parties treated as a motion to dismiss both in their 
filings and oral argument. 
Standard of Review: 
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Co. , 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Society of Separationists, Inc. 
v. Taqqart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993); Casco Servs. Corp. v. 
Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992); McMahan v. Dee's, 873 P.2d 
1172, 1175 (Utah App. 1994); Wade v. Stanql, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 
App. 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 
1110, 1112 (Utah App. 1994). Pursuant to this standard, no 
particular deference is given to the trial court7s ruling on 
questions of law. State v. Penaf 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 
1993); Hiqgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
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Issues Preserved for Appeal; 
All issues presented are based on legal rulings made by the 
lower court interpreting and applying the law in the context of a 
motion to dismiss. The issues were preserved by written memoranda 
and oral argument in opposition to defendants'/appellees Motion to 
Dismiss (R82-141, 170-185, 230-266), and the Notice of Appeal 
(R219-221). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(1) defining a non-conforming 
use. 
2. Zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County, § 19.04.385, 
defining non-conforming use. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707(5), prohibiting the Board of 
Adjustment from granting use variances. 
4. Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.92.040(E), 
prohibiting the Board of Adjustment from granting use variances. 
5. Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.84.110, 
indicating that "a person shall have the right to appeal to the 
Board of County Commissioners any decision rendered by the Planning 
Commission.fl 
6. Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.92.030, 
defining the power of the Board of Adjustment. 
7. Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, § 19.92.050(C), 
prohibiting the Board of Adjustment from considering appeals on 
conditional use decisions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A« Nature of the Case. 
This case arises from the dismissal of Stonebridge's Complaint 
before the Third District Court on a motion to dismiss, treated by 
the lower court as a motion for summary judgment. 
Stonebridge filed its complaint against the defendants, 
appellees with the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 10, 1995. The 
complaint raised four causes of action: 
1. Declaratory judgment concerning vested rights; 
2. A determination that Stonebridge had development rights 
arising from the doctrine of zoning estoppel. 
3. That the action of the County constituted a taking of 
plaintiff's property without just compensation in violation of 
Article I Section 2 2 of the Utah Constitution, the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
4. That the zoning ordinances preventing development of 
plaintiff's property are unconstitutional as applied, resulting in 
a taking of plaintiff's property without just compensation. 
(R3-27) 
Defendants/appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
on or about March 7, 1995. (R45-46) The motion to dismiss came on 
for hearing on June 19, 1995 before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, 
District Court Judge. The lower court took the matter under 
advisement at the conclusion of oral arguments and by memorandum 
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decision dated August 10, 1995 (R191-203) , granted summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint. A question concerning the appropriate 
form of the order was resolved by minute entry of the Court dated 
December 20, 1995 (R215) , on which date the Court entered its final 
order granting summary judgment, dismissing the complaint on 
defendants/appellees' motion to dismiss. (R216-218) 
Stonebridge filed its notice of appeal on January 19, 1996. 
(R219-221) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. In April of 1980, an application for the Stonebridge 
P.U.D. was filed to develop a 29.5 acre parcel of property located 
in Salt Lake County into a 75-unit condominium P.U.D. (R7) 
2. On June 10, 1980, the Salt Lake County Planning Commis-
sion granted approval for a 69-unit development within the 
Stonebridge P.U.D. (R7) 
3. Salt Lake County permitted development of the Stonebridge 
P.U.D. in phases. Each new phase was begun immediately as the 
prior phase was completed and sold. The third phase was completed 
and sold in 1993. Much of the infrastructure that would service 
Phase IV, the subject phase, was completed during and in connection 
with the construction of Phases II and III. (R7) 
4. In 1993, while Phase III was being sold, Stonebridge Land 
Holding Company ("Stonebridge") began preparations to request final 
approval for Phase IV, the subject phase, which includes 16 units 
located in eight buildings on 4.139 acres within the approved 
Stonebridge P.U.D. (R9-10) 
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5. In 1994, despite the Stonebridge P.U.D. application and 
Salt Lake County's approval thereof, approval and construction of 
Phases I, II and III, and the construction of much of the infra-
structure that would service Phase IV, Salt Lake County adopted an 
ordinance down-zoning the subject property. (RIO) 
6. Stonebridge requested final approval to develop Phase IV 
of the Stonebridge P.U.D. by filing a conditional use application 
on that phase. But, on November 8, 1994, the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission denied the request on the basis that the 
Planning Commission lacked jurisdiction to determine whether 
Stonebridge had vested rights to proceed with development. (R126) 
The notice is attached to the Appendix as Tab 3. The Planning 
Commission stated that, "the Planning Commission is not a court of 
law and cannot make a decision until the vested rights issue is 
resolved. . . . It has to be resolved outside of this body." 
Official Minutes of Salt Lake County Planning Commission, Octo-
ber 25, 1994. (R128) The referenced minutes are attached to the 
Appendix as Tab 2. 
7. Stonebridge requested review of that decision by the Salt 
Lake County Commission, pursuant to ordinance and notice from the 
county requiring that any request for review be taken to the Salt 
Lake County Commission. (RH) The Ordinance is attached to the 
Appendix as Tab 1, the Notice (included with the County Planning 
Commission November 8, 1994 letter) is attached to the Appendix as 
Tab 4. 
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$* The County Commission affirmed the decisions of the 
Planning Commission without further hearing. (RH) 
9. This action was brought in the Third District Court, in 
part, to obtain the predicate vested rights determination the 
Planning Commission required before it would consider the merits of 
the Stonebridge application for final Phase IV construction 
approval. 
10. The Complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court on February 10, 1995 requesting relief that Stonebridge had 
vested rights entitling it to the conditional use application it 
requested; that Salt Lake County was estopped from denying the 
conditional use application by principles of zoning estoppel; and 
for just compensation for the regulatory taking of plaintiff's 
property. (R3) 
11. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint 
arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted and that the District Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case. (R45-46) 
12. The basis of defendants' motion was the allegation that 
the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment was the proper body to 
consider Stonebridge's development application involving vested 
rights or to consider the appeal from the Planning Commission. 
Consequently, the County argued Stonebridge did not exhaust its 
administrative remedies and failed to satisfy requirements of 
ripeness and finality. (R45-46) 
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13. Stonebridge responded that, as a matter of law, the Board 
of Adjustment does not have jurisdiction to consider Stonebridge's 
development application in the first instance, or to consider the 
appeal from the Planning Commission, under the statutes and 
ordinances defining the power and authority of the Board of 
Adjustment, and that the County Planning Commission and the Board 
of County Commissioners to whom Stonebridge presented the issue 
were the proper bodies to consider the application. Consequently, 
Stonebridge argued its administrative remedies were exhausted and 
that the requirements of ripeness and finality were satisfied. 
(R82-92, 170-182) 
14. On June 19, 1995, oral argument was presented on 
defendants7 motion to dismiss, and the court took the matter under 
advisement. 
15. By Memorandum Decision dated August 10, 1995, the 
District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing 
all causes of action of the Complaint. (R192-203) A copy of the 
Court's Memorandum Decision is attached to the Appendix as Tab 5. 
16. By Minute Entry dated December 20, 1995, the District 
Court determined that the motion to dismiss should be treated as if 
it were a motion for summary judgment, even though both parties 
treated it as a motion to dismiss in their written memoranda and in 
oral argument. (R215) 
17. On December 20, 199 5, the District Court entered its 
Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing 
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Stonebridge's Complaint. (R216-218) A copy of the Court's Order 
is attached to the Appendix as Tab 6. 
18. Stonebridge filed its Notice of Appeal on January 19, 
1996. (R219-221) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars, have been 
spent in developing the multi-phased development of the 29.5 acre 
Stonebridge Planned Unit Development, approved by Salt Lake County 
in 1980. Three phases of development within P.U.D. have been 
completed. Additional thousands of dollars have been invested in 
infrastructure for Phase IV. Final approval for completion of 
Phase IV development has been requested. However, midstream in 
development of the Stonebridge P.U.D., the area of where the P.U.D. 
is located was down-zoned. 
Principles of vested rights require Salt Lake County to permit 
completion of Phase IV of the Stonebridge P.U.D. consistent with 
the zoning regulations and ordinances in effect when application 
for the P.U.D. was made, and when approval was granted. The Utah 
Supreme Court has roundly criticized the notion that down-zoning 
property mid-stream in development would bar further development: 
A property owner should be able to plan for 
developing his property in a manner permitted 
by existing zoning regulation with some degree 
of assurance that the basic ground rules will 
not be changed mid-stream. 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396 
(Utah 1980). To protect the rights of land owners and developers 
from ex post facto application of zoning ordinances, the Utah 
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Supreme Court adopted one of the more liberal vested rights 
doctrines in the country. See Western Land Equities; Contracts 
Funding & Mortgage Exchange v. Maines. 527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974) (a 
property owner "cannot be circumscribed by ex post facto modus 
operandi legis, such as zoning ordinances presumed to upside-down 
the hour glass"). 
But the Salt Lake County Planning Commission refused to 
consider the merits of the Stonebridge Phase IV development 
application until a determination is made on the vested rights 
issue. At Stonebridge's hearing with the Planning Commission on 
the issue, the Commission indicated: 
The Planning Commission is not a court of law, 
and cannot make a decision until the vested 
right issue is resolved . . . . 
Official Minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, 
October 25, 1994. The County Commission affirmed that decision 
without hearing or comment. 
More than two years after Stonebridge filed its Conditional 
Use Application for Phase IV final approval, it has not yet had an 
opportunity to present the merits of its application. This action 
was commenced, in part, to obtain the vested rights determination 
requested by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. 
The lower court refused to pass on the vested rights issue. 
Instead, it ruled that the Board of Adjustment must make that 
determination. However, the Board of Adjustment has never been 
granted authority to make such a decision. The lower court's 
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ruling runs directly contrary to the controlling statutes of the 
State of Utah and ordinances of Salt Lake County. 
The Board of Adjustment has no authority to grant relief by 
way of a variance. Any such ruling would constitute an unlawful 
use variance expressly prohibited by statute and ordinance. 
Neither can it decide vested rights issues pursuant to its 
authority to deal with non-conforming uses. The statutes and 
ordinances of this case clearly demonstrate that a non-conforming 
use is distinct and different from a vested right, and the Board of 
Adjustment has never been granted authority to resolve vested 
rights issues. Further, the Statutes of this State and the 
Ordinances of Salt Lake County require that applications for 
Conditional Use Permits, such as the permit Stonebridge filed for 
final Phase IV development approval, must be filed with the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission, and any appeals therefrom must be 
taken to the County Commission. The Board of Adjustment is 
expressly prohibited by Ordinance from considering such applica-
tions or appeals. 
The lower court's determination that Stonebridge failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies is plain error. To the contrary, 
Stonebridge spent nearly a year, and thousands of dollars and 
hundreds of hours in fully and conscientiously exhausting any 
applicable administrative remedies. 
The lower court's ruling that the action is barred because it 
was not timely appealed to the District Court is also in error. 
This action is not an appeal from any substantive land use decision 
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of the County. The County never considered the merits of Stone-
bridge's development application. Instead, the Planning Commission 
determined that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the vested rights 
issue because it was not a court of law and requested a determina-
tion of that vested rights issue before it could proceed with the 
merits of the application. The Salt Lake County Commission 
affirmed without hearing. Consequently, this action was filed, in 
part, to obtain the vested rights determination the County 
requested. None of the causes of action of the Complaint involve 
appeals from the action of the Planning Commission and County 
Commission. 
Finally, the lower court erred in its determination that a 
lack of administrative finality and ripeness barred Stonebridge's 
claims. Stonebridge fully and conscientiously exhausted all 
applicable administrative remedies. The lower court ruled that 
Stonebridge should have sought a variance before it commenced its 
claims. But that ruling runs counter to the law. The only 
variance that would help is a use variance, which is prohibited 
both by statute and ordinance. The law is well-settled that 
seeking a variance under such circumstances is not required. In 
any event, the "futility" rule excuses any alleged failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies to finality. 
The lower court's decision is directly contrary to the 
controlling statutes of the State of Utah and ordinances of Salt 
Lake County that are controlling. It is wrong as a matter of law, 
and should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT MUST RESOLVE THE ISSUE 
OP VESTED RIGHTS. 
The fundamental premise of the lower court's decision is that 
the Board of Adjustment is empowered to resolve vested rights 
claims implicit in the conditional use application filed by 
Stonebridge in this case. But that premise is wrong as a matter of 
law. It overlooks, and directly contradicts, numerous controlling 
statutes of this state and ordinances of Salt Lake County. 
The Court based its decision on a flawed interpretation of 
§ 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, which 
specifies the powers of the Board of Adjustment. That Ordinance 
provides as follows:1 
The board of adjustment shall: 
A. Hear and decide appeals from zoning deci-
sions , applying the zoning ordinances as 
provided in § 19.92.050; 
B# Hear and decide the special exceptions to 
the terms of the zoning ordinance set 
forth in § 19.92.060; 
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms 
of the zoning ordinance; and 
D. Determine the existence, expansion or 
modification of non-conforming uses. 
(Ord. 1221 § l(part), 1993). 
1
 § 19.92.030 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced 
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1. 
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Based on this Ordinance, the lower court erroneously concluded 
the Board of Adjustment could resolve the vested rights issue 
pursuant to its authority to grant a variance; pursuant to its 
authority to consider non-conforming uses; or pursuant to its 
authority to hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions. 
(R195-196) 
A careful analysis of each of those conclusions demonstrates 
the Court was in error. The Board of Adjustment cannot deal with 
vested rights issues implicit in conditional use applications under 
the Salt Lake County Ordinances. 
A. The Board of Adjustment is Prohibited, Both by Statute 
and Ordinances, From Granting a Use Variance. 
Under Utah law, the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment has 
no authority to grant a use variance. That is expressly prohibited 
by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707 (5)2 provides: 
The board of adjustment and any other body may 
not grant a use variance. 
(Emphasis added). The ordinances of Salt Lake County also provide 
that "the board of adjustment and any other body may not grant a 
use variance." Salt Lake County zoning ordinances § 19.92.040(E), 
emphasis added. 
The controlling, undisputed facts of this case are that the 
subject property was down-zoned in March of 1994, and the use of 
the property was changed from an A-l zone, which permitted 
condominium P.U.D.s as a conditional use (such as Stonebridge was 
§ 17-27-707 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced 
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1. 
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developing), to an R-l-15 zone, which is a single family residen-
tial zone requiring one-third acre lots per residential structure, 
which does not permit the P.U.D. conditional use. Because the 
down-zoning changed the property's permitted use, the Board of 
Adjustment cannot alter that use by granting a variance. That 
would constitute a prohibited use variance. 
The lower court's ruling runs directly contrary to that 
controlling law. Consequently, the Board of Adjustment has no 
authority to resolve the subject vested rights issue by granting a 
use variance. 
B. A Non-conforming Use is Not the Same Thing as a Vested 
Right. 
The Court also erred in its ruling that the concept of a 
"vested right" is the same thing as a "non-conforming" use, and 
consequently can be resolved by the Board of Adjustment under its 
authority to deal with non-conforming uses. The express, control-
ling statutory provisions and ordinances indicate the opposite is 
true. 
In this State, both by statute and ordinance, the concepts of 
vested rights and non-conforming uses are different, and distinct. 
They are not interchangeable expressions of the same concept. The 
Board of Adjustment has been given authority to determine the 
existence of "non-conforming uses," but it has never been given 
authority to determine the existence of "vested rights." The lower 
court's ruling overlooks those critical — even dispositive — 
facts. 
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By statute, the State of Utah defines a non-conforming use in 
a manner that is inconsistent with and different from a vested 
right. The statutory definition explains: 
"Non-conforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current 
zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since 
the time the zoning regulation govern-
ing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, 
it does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(1) (emphasis added). 
The zoning ordinances of Salt Lake County, Section 19.04.385 
define a "non-conforming use" in a similar fashion—inconsistent 
with the concept of vested rights presented by this case. 
"Non-conforming use" means a use which lawful-
ly occupied a building or land at the time the 
ordinance codified in this title became effec-
tive and which does not conform with the use 
regulations of the zone in which it is locat-
ed. 
The Ordinances of Salt Lake County, Section 19.04.3853, (emphasis 
added). 
By statutory definition, a non-conforming use is a pre-
existing use to which land has actually and continually been placed 
before a change in the zoning ordinance. The Board of Adjustment's 
authority with respect to non-conforming uses is limited according-
ly. 
3
 § 19.04.385 is reproduced in full in the Appendix, Tab 1. 
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In striking contrast, the concept of vested rights presented 
by this case does not deal with a pre-existing use. Instead, it 
focuses on the proposed future development of land for a new and 
different use. 
[A development application] is entitled to 
favorable action if the application conforms 
to the zoning ordinance in effect at the time 
of the application, and unless changes in the 
zoning ordinance are pending which would 
prohibit the use of applied for . . . . 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan. 617 P.2d 388, 391 
(Utah 1980). 
The distinct differences between a "non-conforming use" and a 
"vested right" is graphically demonstrated by the following chart: 
1 NON-CONFORMING USE 
The concept of non-conforming 
use is a creature of statue and 
ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103. 
Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, Section 19.04.385. 
The non-conforming use concept 
is limited to a pre-existing 
use that continuously and law-
fully occupied a building or 
land before a change in the 
zoning ordinance. 
It focuses on the perpetuation 
of a pre-existing use that ac-
1 tually occupied the land. 
In evaluating a non-conforming 
use, the focus is on the prior 
use before a change in zoning 
ordinance. 
VESTED RIGHT 1 
In contrast, the concept of a 
vested right is a judicially 
created common-law doctrine. 
It was adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, independent of 
and without reference to, the 
concept of non-conforming 
use. 1 
The vested rights concept is 
not the continuation of a 
prior use of land. Instead, 
it applies to a proposed dif-
ferent and new use of the 
land. 
In a vested rights analysis, 
the focus is not on a prior 
use, but the date a develop-
ment application is filed for 
a change in the prior use. | 
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A non-conforming use is aban- In contrast, there is no sim-
doned if the continuous use is ilar abandonment element for 
interrupted for a period of determining whether a vested 
sixty days during any twelve- right exists, 
month period. | 
Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake | 
I County, § 19.08.130. J 
In this State, the concepts of vested rights and non-conform-
ing uses are distinct and different. The lower court did not 
consider or discuss the Utah law on this issue, relying instead on 
two cases, one from Connecticut and one from Oregon (R196), where 
the law is different, and the concepts of vested rights and non-
conforming uses are used interchangeably.4 
Under the law of this State, the lower court's ruling is a 
non-sequitur. A non-conforming use is not the same thing as a 
vested right. They are apples and oranges. The Board of Adjust-
ment has never been delegated authority to resolve vested rights 
disputes. 
Consequently, the lower court erred in ruling that vested 
rights and non-conforming use issues are synonymous, entitling the 
Board of Adjustment to decide vested rights issues. 
C. There Was no Appeal That Could Be Taken to the Board of 
Adjustment, 
The lower court also concluded that the zoning decision should 
have been appealed to the Board of Adjustment. But again, that 
Petrazzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, etc., 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn. 
1979); Clackamas County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973). 
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decision is erroneous, directly inconsistent with the controlling 
ordinances. 
The application Stonebridge filed with Salt Lake County for 
the development of the next phase of its P.U.D. approved by Salt 
Lake County in 1981 was a conditional use application. The 
ordinances of Salt Lake County expressly provide that appeals to 
the Board of Adjustment cannot be brought on conditional use 
decisions. Salt Lake County Ordinances, Section 19.92.050(C)5 
provides: 
1. Only zoning decisions applying the ordi-
nance may be appealed to the Board of 
Adjustment. 
2. A person may not appeal, and the board of 
adjustment may not consider, any zoning 
ordinance amendments or conditional use 
decisions. 
That ordinance conclusively disposes of the issue. Conditional use 
applications cannot be appealed to or considered by the Board of 
Adjustment. The Court's reliance is misplaced in any event because 
this action does not involve an appeal from the application of a 
zoning ordinance. No zoning ordinance has been applied. Salt Lake 
County punted, indicating the vested rights issue must be resolved 
before it would consider Stonebridge's conditional use application. 
The possibility of appeal to the Board of Adjustment is also 
flatly foreclosed by § 19.92.050(D)6 of the Zoning Ordinance of 
§ 19.92.050 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced 
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1. 
6
 See Footnote 5. 
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Salt Lake County. That Ordinance expressly prohibits appeals to 
the Board of Adjustment that seek to waive or modify the terms or 
requirements of a zoning ordinance: 
D. Appeals [to the Board of Adjustment] may 
not be used to waive or modify the terms 
or requirements of the zoning ordinance. 
The controlling statutes and ordinances clearly demonstrate 
the Board of Adjustment has no authority to resolve vested rights 
issues. 
POINT II. 
DECLARATORY RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE 
UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED BY THIS CASE. 
The procedural posture of this case is unique. Without a 
declaratory judgment resolving the vested rights issue, or at least 
determining who can resolve it, this matter will remain in 
perpetual limbo. 
Neither the Salt Lake County Planning Commission nor the Board 
of County Commissioners has passed on the merits of Stonebridge's 
Conditional Use application. Instead, they refused to consider the 
merits of the application until the issue of vested rights is 
determined. At the time of the hearing before the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission, the Planning Commission Chairman explained: 
The Planning Commission is not a court of law, 
and we cannot make a decision until the vested 
right issue is resolved. 
We are not going to want to consider this 
until this vested rights issue is resolved. 
It is not up to us to resolve it. It has to 
be resolved outside of this body. 
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I don't think we can do that [pass on the 
pending application] until the vested right 
issue is resolved to whether or not it is a 
legitimate application. 
(R128). A copy of the official Minutes of the Salt Lake Planning 
Commission, dated October 25, 1994, is attached to the Appendix as 
Tab 2. 
The fact t h a t the County did not reach or consider the meri ts 
of the Stonebridge appl ica t ion i s further evidenced by i t s 
November 9, 1994 l e t t e r to Stonebridge, indica t ing the County 
Planning Commission denied the request "on the bas is t ha t i t 
doesn ' t have j u r i s d i c t i o n to determine whether there i s a vested 
r igh t for t h i s project .1 1 A copy of t h i s l e t t e r i s included in the 
Appendix as Tab 3. The Sal t Lake County Commission affirmed t h a t 
act ion without hearing. 
Consequently, t h i s i s not an "appeal" to review the substan-
t i v e meri ts of the decision of the Planning Commission or Board of 
County Commissioners.7 Stonebridge has never been permitted to 
present the meri ts of i t s app l ica t ion . Neither did the Planning 
Commission or the Sal t Lake County Commission ever reach the meri ts 
7
 The lower cour t concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f had t h i r t y (30) days from t h e 
County Commission's December 7, 1994 Decision t o appeal t h e dec i s i on t o t h e 
D i s t r i c t Court . However, S t o n e b r i d g e ' s a c t i o n was not brought by way of appeal 
t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e a c t i o n of t h e Planning Commission and County 
Commission. The r u l e r ega rd ing "appeals" from County Admin i s t r a t ive Hearings t o 
t h e D i s t r i c t Court a p p l i e s only if a person adverse ly a f fec ted by a dec i s ion a t 
t h e County Admin i s t r a t ive Hearing d e s i r e s "review of t h e dec i s ion" with t h e 
D i s t r i c t Court . But t h a t has no a p p l i c a t i o n in t h i s c a s e . Stonebr idge has not 
p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court for review of t h a t d e c i s i o n . Stonebr idge seeks d e c l a r a t o r y 
judgment t h a t i t has ves ted r i g h t s , or a t t h e very l e a s t a d e c i s i o n of who can 
determine whether i t has ves ted r i g h t s . Nei ther of those i s s u e s was addressed 
by t h e Planning Commission or County Commission. 
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of the development application. Neither body considered or 
determined whether vested rights existed. They refused to hear and 
consider that issue, demanding resolution of the vested rights 
issue before they would consider the conditional use applications. 
A declaratory judgment action was brought to obtain the vested 
rights determination the County requested as a predicate to 
considering the development application of Stonebridge. Until a 
declaratory judgment is obtained determining whether vested rights 
exist, or at the very least resolving who can determine whether 
vested rights exist, Stonebridge is placed in an untenable quandary 
that can never be resolved. The Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission has refused to determine whether Stonebridge has vested 
rights, claiming that it has no jurisdiction or authority to do so. 
The County Commission affirmed without comment or hearing. The 
lower court has refused to pass on the issue, and the Board of 
Adjustment does not have authority to pass on the issue. 
Even if Stonebridge resorted to the Board of Adjustment, that 
would not resolve the problem. Any decision by the Board of 
Adjustment would be subject to attack and dispute from community 
residents or others because, as discussed in Point I above, the 
Board of Adjustment has no authority to resolve vested rights 
issues. 
A very real and genuine dispute exists concerning whether 
vested rights exist and who can resolve the vested rights issue 
presented by this case. Stonebridge is entitled to declaratory 
relief resolving the vested rights issue, or determining who can. 
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It is also important to note that several of the causes of 
action of Stonebridge's Complaint are unrelated to the vested 
rights issue in any event. They involve issues of the constitu-
tional taking of plaintiff's property without just compensation in 
violation of Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and whether the zoning ordinances preventing 
development of plaintiff's property are unconstitutional if applied 
to prevent development of plaintiff's property, and, if so, whether 
taking of plaintiff's property has occurred without the payment of 
just compensation, etc. 
None of the claims of the Complaint are an appeal from any 
action taken by the Planning Commission or County Commission. 
POINT III. 
STONEBRIDGE CAREFULLY EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE REMEDIES. 
The lower court's determination that Stonebridge did not 
exhaust available administrative remedies (R196) is also error. To 
the contrary, Stonebridge conscientiously and carefully satisfied 
any such requirement. 
Although Stonebridge believes that the determination of 
whether it has vested rights is a legal decision that can be 
decided by the courts, it did not begin its odyssey by filing a 
complaint in district court. Instead, out of an abundance of 
caution and in an effort to extinguish any defense that Stonebridge 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, it took the issue to 
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the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, and thereafter appealed 
the issue to the Board of County Commissioners. 
The lower court concluded the administrative procedures should 
have gone through the Board of Adjustment. But the County 
Ordinances mandate the course pursued by Stonebridge. 
The development of the subject property is by conditional use 
permit. The Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances provide that the 
Planning Commission is the body required to pass on conditional use 
permits. Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances, Section 19.05.040:8 
The planning commission shall: . . . approve 
or deny conditional use permits; . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, the ordinances provide that all appeals from the 
Planning Commission's conditional use decision shall go to the 
County Commission. 
Any person shall have the right to appeal to 
the board of county commissioners any [condi-
tional use] decision rendered by the Planning 
Commission . . . . 
Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances, Section 19.84.1109 See also 
Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1981) (the Utah 
Supreme Court expressly approved appeals of conditional use permits 
from a County Planning Commission to the County Commissioners and 
not to the Board of Adjustment). 
§ 19.05.040 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced 
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1. 
9
 § 19.84.110 of the Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County is reproduced 
in full in the Appendix, Tab 1. 
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Furthermore, the ordinances of Salt Lake County clearly 
instruct that the Board of Adjustment cannot consider conditional 
use permits. lf[T]he board of adjustment may not consider any . . . 
conditional use decisions." Salt Lake County Ordinances, 
§ 19.92.050(C). 
Therefore, as required by ordinance, Stonebridge brought its 
conditional use application to the Planning Commission, and 
appealed it to the County Commission. Indeed, the County sent 
Stonebridge a notice directing that any appeal should go to the 
County Commission. A copy of that notice is attached to the 
Appendix as Tab 4. 
The inescapable fact is that Stonebridge went to great lengths 
to insure that any administrative remedies were exhausted. For 
over seven (7) months Salt Lake County refused to take action on 
plaintiff's pending application for final development approval of 
the subject property. Stonebridge complained that the County was 
stonewalling, and indicated it wanted the County to consider the 
application before litigation commenced, to eliminate any defense 
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Ultimately, after 
pressing the County for nearly a year, the County Planning 
Commission and County Commission finally considered the issue, at 
plaintiff's request, exhausting any applicable administrative 
remedies. 
The matter was not brought before the Board of Adjustment 
because that body does not have authority to deal with conditional 
use applications, and the vested rights issues inherent therein. 
25 
See Point I hereof. Pursuing an application before a board that 
has no authority to hear it, or grant it, is certainly not required 
by even the most liberal application of the exhaustion of remedies 
doctrine. Indeed, any requisite administrative remedies would not 
have been exhausted had Stonebridge pursued the issue before the 
Board of Adjustment. 
POINT IV. 
THIS ACTION FULLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RIPENESS AND FINALITY, 
The lower court's determination that the doctrines of ripeness 
and finality require dismissal of the Complaint is also error. 
(R200-201) As set forth in Point III above, Stonebridge fully and 
conscientiously exhausted any applicable administrative remedies. 
The lower court decision suggests that Stonebridge should have 
"applied for variances to the R-l-15 zoning" before any action by 
the County could become final. But as discussed above, that would 
constitute an application for a use variance. Under Utah law, Salt 
Lake County has no authority to grant a use variance.10 The recent 
down-zoning of the property by Salt Lake County changed the 
permitted use. Consequently, a different use cannot be permitted 
by variance. 
Under such circumstances, failing to request a use variance 
does not present ripeness or finality problems. To the contrary, 
the case law uniformly holds that where a variance is not available 
"The Board of Adjustment and any other body may not grant a use 
variance." (emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707(5); Salt Lake County 
Zoning Ordinances, Section 19.92.40(e). 
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under local law there is no requirement to pursue a variance. 
Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster. 881 F.2d 1570, 1575 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that a taking claim is ripe where "there are no 
variances available under the applicable local law"). See 
Herrinqton v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), 
amended in part. 857 F.2d 567 (1988) (application for a variance 
need not be made if it would be futile). 
In any event, the lower court's ruling overlooks the clear 
application of the "futility" rule under the circumstances. The 
law is well settled that pursuing administrative remedies to 
finality is not required if it would be a futile act. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the "act of re-zoning is the strongest as 
possible, if not irrefutable indication that the County is opposed" 
more intense development of property. Hoehne v. County of San 
Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 1989). Consequently, when 
property is down-zoned to prevent more intense development, 
pursuing the futility of administrative hearings requesting more 
intense development is futile and not required. 
In this case, down-zoning the subject property is the 
strongest, most irrefutable evidence of the futility of pursuing 
any administrative remedies to permit the planned development of 
the property, which is not permitted under the new zoning. 
Consequently, the act of down-zoning the subject property satisfies 
any finality requirement with respect to the use of that property. 
Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071, 1073 cert. 
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah App. 1992) ("the law does not require 
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the exhaustion of administrative remedies when it would serve no 
useful purpose11); Herrinaton v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th 
Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); State Department of 
Taxation v. Scotsman Mfg. , 849 P.2d 317, 319 (Nev. 1993) (the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply where 
administrative proceedings would be futile); City of Bellevue v. 
Kravir (Wash. App. 1993) (exhaustion of remedies does not apply 
where it would be futile). 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's decision is wrong as a matter of law. It 
overlooks or misconstrues the controlling — even dispositive — 
statutes of this State and ordinances of Salt Lake County. 
The Board of Adjustment is not authorized to resolve vested 
rights decisions. That is either a matter for the Planning 
Commission/County Commission, where the matter was pursued by 
Stonebridge, or for the courts. Any administrative remedies were 
fully exhausted, and the doctrine of finality and ripeness is 
plainly satisfied. 
Under the circumstances, the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEVIN EGAR AWbERSON '" "^ 
/ of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
November 11, 1996 
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Commission, October 25, 1994 Hearing concerning the 
Stonebridge Conditional Use Application. 
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Tab 5: Memorandum Decision of the lower court dismissing 
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Tab 6: Order of the Court dismissing Stonebridge's Complaint by 
Summary Judgment. 
Tabl 
Utah Code Annotated 
5 17-27-103(1) Definitions 
(1) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the 
zoning regulation governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform 
with the zoning regulations that now govern the land. 
Utah Code Annotated 
§ 17-27-707 Variances 
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of 
the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of 
property that he owns, leases, or in which he holds some other 
beneficial interest may apply to the board of adjustment for a 
variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(2) (a) The board of adjustment may grant a variance only 
if: 
(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would 
cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is 
not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the 
zoning ordinance; 
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the 
property that do not generally apply to other properties 
in the same district; 
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the 
enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by 
other property in the same district; 
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the 
general plan and will not be contrary to the public 
interest; and 
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed 
and substantial justice done. 
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship 
under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment may not 
find an unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hard-
ship: 
(A) is located on or associated with the 
property for which the variance is sought; and 
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the 
property, not from conditions that are general to 
the neighborhood. 
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of the 
zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under 
Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find 
an unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed 
or economic. 
(c) In determining whether or not there are special 
circumstances attached to the property under Subsection 
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may find that special circum-
stances exist only if the special circumstances: 
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and 
(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to 
other properties in the same district. 
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all 
of the conditions justifying a variance have been met. 
(4) Variances run with the land. 
(5) The board of adjustment and any other body may not grant 
use variances. 
(6) In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may 
impose additional requirements on the applicant that will: 
(a) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 
(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement 
that is waived or modified. 
ZONING ORDINANCE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.04.385 Nonconforming use. 
"Nonconforming use" means a use which lawfully occupied a 
building or land at the time the ordinance codified in this title 
became effective and which does not conform with the use regula-
tions of the zone in which it is located. (Prior code § 22-1-
6(50)) 
ZONING ORDINANCE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
S 19.05.040 Powers and duties. 
The planning commission shall: 
A. Prepare and recommend a master plan and amendments to the 
master plan to the board of county commissioners; 
B. Recommend zoning ordinances and maps and amendment to 
zoning ordinances and maps tot he board of county commissioners; 
C. Recommend subdivision ordinances and amendment to those 
ordinances to the board of county commissioners; 
D. Recommend approval or denial of subdivision applications 
to the board of county commissioners; 
E. Approve or deny conditional use permits; 
F. Advise the board of county commissioners on matters that 
the board of county commissioners directs; 
G. Provide other functions as specified in this chapter or 
as directed by the board of county commissioners. (Ord. 1220 § 1 
(part), 1993) 
ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.84.110 Appeal of planning commission decision. 
A. Any person shall have the right to appeal to the board of 
county commissioners any decision rendered by the planning 
commission by filing in writing, and in triplicate, stating the 
reasons for the appeal with the board of county commissioners 
within ten days following the date upon which the decision is made 
by the planning commission. After receiving the appeal the county 
commission may reaffirm the planning commission decision, remand 
the matter to the planning commission for further consideration, or 
set a date for a public hearing. 
B. Notification of Planning Commission. The board of county 
commissioners shall notify planning commission of the date of the 
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding the date set for 
hearing so that the planning commission may prepare the record for 
the hearing. 
B. Determination by Board of County Commissioners. The 
board of county commissioners after proper review of the decision 
of the planning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for 
further review and consideration any action taken by the planning 
commission. (Ord. 1004 § 2, 1987: prior code § 22-31-2(6)) 
ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.88.080 Nonconforming use of land. 
The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this title 
became effective, may be continued provided that no such noncon-
forming use of land shall in any way be expanded or extended either 
on the same or adjoining property, and provided that if such 
nonconforming use of land, or any portion thereof, is abandoned or 
changed for a period of one year or more, any future use of such 
land shall be in conformity with the provision of this title. 
(Prior code § 22-4-11) 
ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.88.130 Abandonment. 
A nonconforming use shall be deemed abandoned if the use has 
not applied to the premises for a consecutive period of sixty days 
during any twelve-month period, (Ord. 1207 § 2, 1992; prior code 
§ 22-4-12) 
ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.92.040 Variances. 
A. Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of 
the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of 
property that he/she owns, leases, or in which he/she holds some 
other beneficial interest may apply to the board of adjustment for 
a variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
B. 1. The board of adjustment may grant a variance only if: 
a. Literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would 
cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is 
not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the 
zoning ordinance; 
b. There are special circumstances attached to the 
property that do not generally apply to other properties in 
the same district; 
c. Granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment 
of a substantial property right possessed by other property 
in the same district; 
d. The variance will not substantially affect the 
general plan and will not be contrary to the public 
interest; and 
e. The spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and 
substantial just done. 
2. a. In determining whether or not enforcement of the 
zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under 
subsection (B) (1) , the board of adjustment may not find an 
unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship: 
(i) Is located on or associated with the property 
for which the variance is sought; and 
(ii) Comes from circumstances peculiar to the 
property, not from conditions that are general to the 
neighborhood. 
b. In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning 
ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under subsec-
tion (B)(1), 1, the board of adjustment may not find an 
unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or 
economic. 
3. In determining whether or not there are special 
circumstances attached to the property under subsection (B) (1) , 
the board of adjustment may find that special circumstances 
exist only if the special circumstances: 
a. Relate to the hardship complained of; and 
b. Deprive the property of privileges granted to other 
properties in the same district. 
C. The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of 
the conditions justify a variance have been met. 
D. Variances run with the land. 
E. The board of adjustment and any other body may not grant 
use variances. 
F. In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may impose 
additional requirement on the applicant that will: 
1. Mitigate any harmful effects of the variance; or 
2. Serve the purpose of the standard or requirement that 
is waived or modified. (Ord. 1221 § 1 (part), 1993) 
ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.92.050 Appeals. 
A. 1. The applicant or any other person or entity adversely 
affected by a zoning decision administering or interpreting a 
zoning ordinance may appeal that decision applying the zoning 
ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision or determination made by an official in 
the administration or interpretation of the zoning ordinance• 
2. Any officer, department, board or bureau of a county 
affected by the grant or refusal of a building permit or by any 
other decisions of the administrative officer in the adminis-
tration or interpretation of the zoning ordinance may appeal 
any decision to the board of adjustment. 
B. The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of 
proving that an error has been made. 
C. 1. Only zoning decisions applying the ordinance may be 
appealed to the board of adjustment. 
2. A person may not appeal, and the board of adjustment 
may not consider, any zoning ordinance amendment or conditional 
use decisions. 
D. Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or 
requirements of the zoning ordinance. 
E. An appeal to the board of adjustment must be filed at the 
development services division of Salt Lake County within sixty days 
after the order, requirement decision or determination administer-
ing or interpreting the zoning ordinance is made in writing. The 
appeal shall set forth with specificity the reasons or grounds for 
the appeal. 
F. Appeals shall follow the procedures set forth in the rules 
of the board of adjustment. (Ord. 1221 § 1 (part), 1993) 
ZONING ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
§ 19.92.030 Powers and Duties. 
The board of adjustment shall: 
A. Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions applying the 
zoning ordinance as provided in Section 19•92.050; 
B. Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms of the 
zoning ordinance set forth in Section 19.92.060; 
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance; and 
D. Determine the existence, expansion or modification of 
nonconforming uses. (Ord. 1221 § 1 (part), 1993). 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PLAN.-iNG COMMISSION 
OCTOBER 25 , 1994 
materials and roofs comes about because we have seen some storage units that ended up with red roofs anc 
blue doors. This one would weather to a gray. 
By motion seconded, the Planning Commission approved this application with staff recommendations, 
including the latitude for the roofing material as outlined by the applicant. 
PL-94-2223 - THE CHILDREN & TEEN PREGNANCY FOUNDATION - 7046 S. 700 E. - PUBLIC/QUASI-PUBLIC 
USE (HOUSING FOR TEENAGE UNWED MOTHERS) - R-2-10 ZONE - UNION 
The applicant has requested the application be continued to the meeting of 12/13/94. 
By motion seconded, the Planning Commission continued this application to the meeting of Decembe 
13, 1994, at the request of the applicant. 
PL-94-3004 - STONEBRIDGE LAND HOLDING CO. - 9750 S. 4000 E. - DWELLING GROUP (16 UNITS) - A-' 
ZONE - GRANITE 
Bill Marsh - The applicant is a proposal for an phase in the Stonebridge Condominiums. The applicant i: 
proposing to add 1 6 additional units located on south side. Staff recommends that the Planning Commissioi 
hear the information from both sides and continue the application for two weeks so that you can consider th 
information then field trip the site. 
Jack Grace - 4085 E. Cory Drive - Vice President of the Stonebridge Land Holding Company - I've been involve* 
in this project since 1986. We decided to go into a first phase for the property, allowing for a 19 lot P.U.C 
off of Alta Approach Road. We are asking for an in fill of a piece of property which is surrounded on both side 
by development. On one side is the 1 -1 condominiums and the other side the 19 lot P.U.D. We wanted to hav 
someone speak as to our vested right. 
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - The Planning Commission is not a court of law, 
and can not make a decision until the vested right issue is resolved. 
Kent Lewis - County Deputy Attorney - I told them they could make a brief presentation. 
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - We are not going to want to consider this until this vested rig* 
issue is resolve. It is not up to us to resolve it. It has to be resolved outside of this body. 
Jack Grace - Then we are just asking for a decision by your body to whether you are approving our plan or noi 
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - I don't think we can do that until the vested right issue 
resolved to whether or not it is a legitimate application. Will the vested right issue be resolved in two week: 
Kevin Anderson - 201 S. Main Street #1300 - There is a doctrine in the law called exhaustion of administrate 
remedies which requires that before a party resort to the courts, it must first exhaust all of its administrate 
remedies. Meaning going to the Planning Commission, County Commission and attempting to obtain permissk 
so that if possible legal action in the courts could be avoided. It is possible that the vested rights issue can i 
resolved by stipulation or agreement with the County Attorney's office and that is why they wanted us to mai 
this presentation. 
David Brems - Planning Commission Chairman - Why are we hearing this. 
Kent Lewis - County Deputy Attorney - They have to exhaust their administrative remedies. I don't know 
I agree that this is the appropriate body to exhaust them before. I would like to have a brief explanation. The 
may be some compromises between what can be done under the original approval and what can be done unc 
the new ordinance. So I wanted you to at least have a flavor as to what their original claim is and what th 
are proposing because you are going to have to be involved in any compromise if there is to be one. 
m 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 
OCTOBER 2 5 , 1 9 9 4 
Kevin Anderson - Once we acquire vested rights to use our property for a particular purpose, subsequer 
changes in zoning laws or land use laws cannot prevent that use. An application for subdivision approval 
entit led to favorable action if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in affect at the time of tn 
application. An application was filed and approved in 1980 for 75 units, on the entire 29.5 acre parcel as 
P.U.D. It was also approved to pursue that development in phases. When that was finished the next pare 
of this development began. That involved an amendment to the existing P.U.D., it included about 1 5 acres < 
the property and 19 single family lots were approved, recorded, developed and sold. That left in the cent* 
of the property a couple of pieces. On the heals of the end of that second phase, another phase began, Th 
was construct ion of the pool complex. That left 4.1 acres in the middle of the property, which had rt 
intention of being developed as P.U.D. condominiums. That is the application that is before you today. 
Richard Young - Granite Community Council - The history of the entire development began in 1980. In M< 
of 1982 approval was given for 11 units, but the Granite Community Council did not approve 69 units. Tr 
master plan shows single family dwellings on 1/2 acre lots and no commercial development except for the i 
Caille Restaurant. Other developers have cooperated to keep the area consistent. There is no approval for xt 
application. They withdrew their residential application and have instead come back w i th this 16 ur 
application. The applicant is actively pursuing ski rental ventures wi th advertisements in ski magazines. I a; 
the Planning Commission to field trip the site preferably on a weekend afternoon and to take the grade ar 
incline into consideration. The contrast between the 11 units and the rest of the neighborhood was a sta 
contrast. The developer needs to cooperate wi th the neighborhood. They should develop but within tl 
parameters of the Hillside Ordinance and the master plan. 
Tom Haywall - 3916 E. Alta Approach - Read a letter by his homeowners association into the record. Thn 
owners support this application. Nine of the owners do not support this application and ask that i 
development be allowed that does not conform to the Granite Community Master Plan and the Hillsif 
Ordinance. 
By motion seconded, the Planning Commission continued this application to the meeting of Novemb 
8, 1994 , to be on for decision only. 
Kent Lewis - County Deputy Attorney - If there is not a vested right the Planning Commission would have 
jurisdiction to approve the proposal because it doesn't comply wi th the present zoning. If there is a vest 
right, since they only had a preliminary approval and this is not the identical application, the Planni 
Commission would still have to hear it and approve this site plan. There is also a vested rights agreemc 
where we compromise the matter and enter into a contract giving them a vested right to something less th 
they claim but more than they can do under the present ordinance. That is what we are working out with t 
adjoining piece of property. Any kind of agreement like that would come back the Planning Commission 
review. 
PL-94-2235 - KENNETH 0 . MELBY - 4711 & 4725 S. HOLLADAY BLVD. (2275 E.) - 2 STORY OFFI 
BUILDING - C-2 ZONE - HOLL/COTT 
John Young - The applicant is proposing to remove an old grocery store and service station to construct a t 
story office building. 
Staff recommends approval subject to the fol lowing: 
1. Meet w i th the staff for review and final approval of the site plan. 
2. Receive and agree to the recommendations from other agencies, i.e.; Fire Department, City-Coui 
Health Dept., Urban Hydrology, etc. 
3. Dedication of 40 ' from center line of Holladay Blvd. to Salt Lake County for street r ight-of-way. 
4. Submit three copies of a planting and sprinkling plan showing types, sizes and placement of pi 
material to the staff for review and approval. This plan should save the existing trees where possii 
5. Install curb, gutter and sidewalk on all public streets at the correct alignment. 
6. No signs are approved wi th this request, they require separate approval. 
7. Install a 6' high solid visual barrier wood fence or masonry wall around the north & east property li 
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November 9, 1994 
STONEBRIDGE LANDHOLDING CO. 
3309 FAIRMONT DRIVE 
NASHVILLE TN 84092 
RE: PL-94-3004 - A Dwelling Group (16 Units) at 9750 S. 4000 E. 
S U I T LUKE COUNTY 
Salt Lake County 
Public Works 
Department 
Development Servic 
Division 
Randy Horiuchi 
Salt Lake County 
Commissioner 
Lonnie L. Johnson 
Director of Public Works 
Ken Jones 
Division Director 
On November 8, 1994, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission denied 
this request on the basis that it doesn't have jurisdiction to determine 
whether there is a vested right for this project. 
Respectfully, 
William A. Marsh 
Section Manager 
^ A . £ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTEr 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N3600 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84190-4050 
Tel (801)468-2000 
TDD (801) 468-2877 
Fax (801)468-2169 
Printed on Recycled Paper 
WAM/t f 
Enc: Appeal Policy 
pc: Granite 
Business License 
Sandy Sullivan/Danny Vranes 
9764 S. Little Cottonwood Place 
Sandy UT 84092 
Kevin Anderson 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Uta Center, 13th Floor 
201 S. Main Street 
SLC UT 84111-2215 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ZONING ORDINANCE 
! 19.84.110 Appeal of Planning Commission Decision 
A. Any person shall have the right to appeal to the Board of 
County Commissioners any decision rendered by the Planning 
Commission by filing in writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons 
for the appeal with the Board of County Commissioners within ten 
days following the date upon which the decision is made by the 
Planning Commission. After receiving the appeal the County 
Commission may reaffirm the Planning Commission Decision, 
remand the matter to the Planning Commission for further 
consideration, or set a date for a public hearing. 
B. Notification of Planning Commission. The Board of County 
Commissioners shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of 
the review, in writing, at least seven days preceding the date set for 
hearing so that the Planning Commission may prepare the record for 
the hearing. 
C. Determination by Board of County Commissioners. The Board 
of County Commissioners after proper review of the decision of the 
Planning Commission may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further 
review and consideration any action taken by the Planning 
Commission. (Ord. 1004 § 2, 19S7: prior code § 22-31-2(6)) 
Salt Lake County Commission 
2 0 0 1 South State Street, Suite IM2100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1000 
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By 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
ST0NEBRID6E LAND HOLDING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah; THE BOARD OP 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OP SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI; 
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERSON; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10; 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950900959 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
defendants71 "Motion to Dismiss" plaintiff's2 Complaint. Plaintiff 
opposed this motion. On June 19, 1995, the parties, through their 
respective counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Kevin Egan Anderson 
in behalf of plaintiff, and Kent S. Lewis, Deputy County Attorney, 
in behalf of defendants, presented oral argument to the Court. At 
defendants in this matter are Salt Lake County, the Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, Randy Horiuchi, Mary 
Callahan, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Planning Commission and 
John Does 1-10. Collectively they are referred to as "defendants." 
2Plaintiff is Stonebridge Land Holding Company and is hereafter 
referred to as "plaintiff" or "Stonebridge." 
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the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement• 
The Court has now carefully considered the Motion, Memoranda 
and Affidavit and other documents submitted by the parties, and the 
arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, and for good cause 
shown, the Court hereby enters the following ruling. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds 
it fails to state a cause upon which relief can be granted and that 
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. More 
particularly, defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies and that the matter is not ripe for 
adjudication. Defendants further contend that the Planning 
Commission properly refused to consider Stonebridge's conditional 
use application on the grounds that (1) the Board of Adjustments 
and not the Salt Lake County Planning Commission had authority to 
decide the vested rights issue; (2) Stonebridge failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies by refusing to request the Board of 
Adjustments to consider its claims; and (3) Stonebridge's 
constitutional taking claim is not ripe for adjudication because 
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County 
as to what it will be allowed to construct. 
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This Motion was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion is that it must be "apparent that under no set of facts 
proven in support of the claim as pleaded would [Stonebridge] be 
entitled to relief." Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olsen, Inc., 815 P.2d 
1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, defendants submitted an affidavit in support of 
their Motion, and both parties produced other evidence for the 
Court to consider. Accordingly, this Motion may be treated as a 
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The standard for summary 
judgment is that there may be no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The non-moving party is 
entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence presented to the Court.3 
The central issue in this case revolves around who, among the 
defendants, if anyone, has the authority to determine whether a 
particular interest claimed constitutes a "vested right" and 
whether a "vested right" should be considered the same as or at 
Notwithstanding the fact defendants submitted the Affidavit 
and both parties produced other evidence to the Court, the parties 
have approached this motion as a motion to dismiss and not as a 
motion for summary judgment. 
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least comparable to a non-conforming use. The material facts in 
this case are not in dispute, they are set forth fully in the 
pleadings. 
I. 
Pursuant to Section 19.92.030 of the Salt Lake County Code of 
Ordinances, 1986, the Board of Adjustment has the power to 
A. Hear and decide appeals from zoning decisions 
applying the zoning ordinances as provided in Section 
19.92.050; 
B. Hear and decide the special exceptions to the terms 
of the zoning ordinances set forth in Section 19.92.060; 
C. Hear and decide variances from the terms of the 
zoning ordinance; and 
D. Determine the existence, expansion or modification 
of nonconforming use. 
Under Section 19.92.030 plaintiff could have (1) appealed to 
the Board of Adjustment under subsection A when the Development 
Services Division refused to acknowledge plaintiff's vested rights 
claim; (2) applied to the Board of Adjustment under subsection C 
for variances to the current R-l-15 zoning; or (3) applied to the 
Board of Adjustment under subsection D claiming it has a vested 
right to nonconforming use status. 
Instead of pursuing its claim before the Board of Adjustment, 
plaintiff proceeded to file its Complaint in district court. 
Pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(1) Utah Code Ann. (1991), M[n]o 
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person may challenge in district court a county's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their 
administrative remedies.ff 
Plaintiff claims that the Board of Adjustment does not have 
jurisdiction to consider its claim because plaintiff's claim 
concerns a claimed vested right as opposed to a nonconforming use 
and that no ordinance or other law authorizes the Board of 
Adjustment to determine the existence of "vested rights." 
However, Section 19.92.030 clearly authorizes the Board, among 
other things, to determine the existence of "nonconforming uses." 
The concepts of "vested rights" and "nonconforming uses" have been 
used interchangeably in other jurisdictions to refer to partially 
completed developments as well as fully completed developments. 
Petrazzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, etc., 408 A.2d 243, 246 (Conn. 
1979); Clackamas County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973)4. 
Based on the foregoing and the other arguments set forth by 
defendants, because plaintiff failed to have the Board of 
Adjustment decide plaintiff's issues, plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action are dismissed. 
4See, also, the discussion regarding vested 
rights/nonconforming uses in Section II and other arguments set 
forth by defendants. 
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II. 
Plaintiff presented its cause to the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission and the Salt Lake County Commission notwithstanding 
their determination that plaintiff should proceed before the Board 
of Adjustments. As such, plaintiff ignored its requirement to 
exhaust its administrative remedies and then ignored its obligation 
to comply with Section 17-27-1001 Utah Code Ann. (1991) ,5 which 
requires a petition for review of the decision below be filed 
timely with the district court; namely: within 3 0 days after the 
local decision is rendered6. 
In this case plaintiff had 3 0 days from the County 
Commission's December 7, 1994, decision to file a petition 
appealing the decision with the district court. However, the 
Complaint was not filed until February 10, 1995, some 65 days after 
the County Commission decision. 
5Section 17-27-1001(2) provides as follows: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a 
petition for review of this decision with the district 
court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
6Plaintiff argues that it did not have to appear before either 
the Planning Commission nor the Zoning Commission. However, this 
position is not persuasive. As a matter of law, plaintiff was 
required to exhaust its applicable administrative remedies, supra. 
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Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional. Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Peav v, Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1980) . 
Moreover, pursuant to Section 17-27-1001(3), an appeal to the 
district court is limited as follows to 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the [administrative] 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
The limitations on the court's review of the administrative 
decision before set forth in Section 17-27-1001(3) underscore the 
importance and necessity of developing a factual record through the 
administrative review process. 
Stonebridge's argument that "vested rights" issues must be 
decided exclusively by the courts because they concern issues of 
law is meritless. Issues regarding vested rights/nonconforming 
uses involve determinations both of fact and law. The clear 
administrative scheme of the current statutes is to require the 
development of the factual record in the administrative context. 
In this process, legal issues are addressed. There is nothing 
unique about "vested rights" as compared to "nonconforming uses" so 
far as the necessity of developing the factual record is concerned. 
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Similarly, Stonebridge may not ask for a declaratory judgment 
when Utah law expressly provides for an appeal of the County 
Commissioners' decision to the Court. Otherwise, as Salt Lake 
County notes, a party who failed to file a timely appeal could 
avoid the 30-day requirement simply by asking for declaratory 
judgment. Therefore, Stonebridge's first two causes of action for 
declaratory judgment and estoppel are not properly before the 
Court. 
Both parties rely on Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 
(Utah App. 1994), to support their respective positions. In 
Stucker. the plaintiff filed an action seeking declaratory judgment 
relief, writ of mandamus relief and damages resulting from an 
alleged unconstitutional, inverse taking of plaintiff's property. 
However, plaintiff's reliance on Stucker in this case is misplaced 
because it was filed prior to the enactment of Section 17-27-703 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992), which grants enabling authority for 
boards of adjustment to decide nonconforming uses. 
Stucker was also decided prior to the enactment of Section 17-
27-1001 which provides for an appeal to the district court from 
planning and county commission land use decisions. The prior code 
did not contain similar provisions. 
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Thus, Stucker, like all of the Utah cases on which plaintiff 
relies concerning vested rights issues, occurred prior to the 
enactment of this legislation. At the times in which these cases 
were filed, boards of adjustment had no authority to determine 
nonconforming use issues and there was no appeal process to the 
district court from planning and county commission land use 
decisions. Declaratory and Rule 65B actions were the only remedies 
available to review land use issues. Based on the legislation 
having become effective in 1991 and 1992 as discussed above, 
parties now seeking determinations concerning nonconforming 
use/vested rights issues must comply with the relevant appeal 
process and time requirements. 
III. 
Finally, Stonebridge may not maintain its takings claim for 
compensation under the United States or Utah Constitutions because 
Stonebridge has not secured a final decision from Salt Lake County 
as to what it will be allowed to construct. 
In this case, as previously discussed, plaintiff should have 
applied to the Board of Adjustments to have the vested rights issue 
determined and, if necessary, applied for variances to the R-l-15 
zoning. Since 1992, Section 17-27-703(2) (Supp. 1992) has enabled 
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cities and counties to delegate to their respective boards of 
adjustment the authority to decide nonconforming use issues. Prior 
to 1992, boards of adjustment had no such power. The cases on 
which plaintiff relies to support its contentions regarding 
ripeness and finality arose prior to the 1992 amendments and do not 
involve exhaustion of remedies or ripeness issues. 
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that it would be futile 
for plaintiff to seek administrative remedies as discussed, supra. 
Here, the County Planning Commission has not denied Stonebridge the 
right to develop. Rather, approximately 15 years ago, it granted 
preliminary approval to the development. The Board of Adjustment 
has not denied plaintiff's claim to a vested right nor denied 
variances to the present ordinance. This is not a case in which a 
remedy does not exist. To the contrary, this is a case in which 
the developer has refused to pursue its remedy. 
Based on the foregoing, and the other arguments set forth by 
defendants, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in its 
entirety. 
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Counsel for defendants is ordered to prepare a proposed Order 
consistent with this ruling. 
Dated thisA^d_~.day of August, 1995. 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this, day of 
August, 1995: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Kevin Egan Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
201 S. Main, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent S. Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STONEBRIDGE LAND HOLDING : ORDER 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation/ 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 950900959 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body : 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah; THE BOARD OF : 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; RANDY HORIUCHI; : 
MARY CALLAHAN; BRENT OVERSON; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING : 
COMMISSION; JOHN DOES 1-10; 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under which relief may be granted and for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction came before the Court for hearing on June 19, 1995 at 
9:00 a.m., the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding; Kevin Egan 
Anderson appeared on behalf of plaintiff, Kent Lewis appeared on 
behalf of defendants. The motion was based upon the contention 
that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies that 
the matter was not ripe for decision. The Court treated the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment because an affidavit was filed by 
defendants and other documents were presented to the Court by both 
parties. The Court having considered the pleadings, Memoranda, and 
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documents filed by the parties and having rendered a Memorandum 
decision granting defendants' motion and stating the grounds for 
such decision, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of defendants, 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. The parties shall each bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Dated this g^^-day of December, 1995. ^ , . _ . .._. ,-"'" -X 
Qi-JTh 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STONEBRIDGE V. S.L. COUNTY PAGE THREE ORDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, to the following, this, .day of December, 
1995: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Kevin Egan Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
201 S. Main, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent S. Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
